Chapter 2

Church and State versus Church and People

The Two Social Orders of the Russian Orthodox Church

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The ways in which Russian Orthodox religion has negotiated its relationship with secular state power are as diverse as they are fascinating.[1] In this book about the multifaceted engagement of Russian Orthodoxy with the secular order, two particular modes of engagement or, as I call them in this chapter, two "social orders" stand out: Russian Orthodoxy as a state church and Russian Orthodoxy as a people's church. Drawing on two different theoretical perspectives on religion-state relations—the Byzantine concept of *symphonia* and the modern concept of public religion—this chapter sketches these two orders throughout Russian history. With reference to secondary literature about the Byzantine Orthodox concept of *symphonia*, church-state relations during the Russian Empire, and debates over the state and secularism by Russian religious philosophers, and using works about the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church and official declarations made by the Moscow Patriarchate, the chapter offers a genealogy of how these two social orders developed within the Russian Church since the eighteenth century.

Symphonia and Public Religion: Two Theoretical Perspectives on Religion and the Secular State

In any discussion about the relationship between Russian Orthodoxy and secularism, one cannot avoid the doctrine and teaching of *symphonia*. In the *Eisagoge* (also referred to as *Epanagoge*), a law codex promulgated by the Byzantine emperor Basil the Great in the second half of the ninth century, the doctrine is described as follows: "The temporal power and the priesthood relate to each other as body and soul; they are necessary for state order just as body and soul are necessary in a living man. It is in their linkage and harmony that the well-being of a state lies."[2] *Symphonia* is the outward sign of a regulated state order based on two sources of authority: the worldly order displayed in the emperor, on the one hand, and the church (that is, the spiritual order) represented by the patriarch, on the other. Both institutions depend on the cooperation of the other for the system to work, since both serve one and the same Christian community.

In practical terms, in the condition of *symphonia*, the Byzantine Church saw itself not as rivaling or standing against the emperor, but as part of a relationship in which both sides worked together to serve the interest of the people. The concept of *symphonia* was, in essence, not much different from Western Christian models of the time—Augustine's doctrine of "two cities" or the Gelasian theory of "two swords"—but unlike in the West, where these models were challenged in the course of the Middle Ages and eventually replaced by secularism as a statecraft doctrine, in the Orthodox world the tension between church and state over the right balance of power remained unresolved.[3] The emperor, as head of state, was subordinated to the true spiritual ruler—Christ Pantocrator. Patriarchs were assigned the task of constantly reminding worldly rulers of this fact and of their obligations toward God and to the people. Thus, the Orthodox Church was permanently torn between the demands of a "high" church in direct proximity to the sovereign and the demands of the people's church serving the community.[4]

Public religion is a modern concept that tries to capture the political role of religion. We generally assume that the modern secularization process divorces political thinking and religious beliefs from each other, with religion becoming a matter of private conscience. Seen from a secular perspective, religion can thus become a valid and justifiable engine to drive active civic commitment.[5] However, apart from the indirect political role of religion via personal religious beliefs that drive social attitudes and behavior, religion can also have a direct

political impact through institutionalized relations between churches and faith communities and state institutions. This is the second meaning of *public religions*, and, at least in Europe, we find diverse models of institutionalized public religions.[6] Thus, strictly speaking, the secularization process brings forth two forms of public religion: religious persuasions in private that motivate public engagement and public religious institutions that interact with the political sphere.

The ancient concept of *symphonia* and the modern notion of public religion share one aspect; they both express the dual role that religion plays in the order of state and society. Just as for the proper historical and theological understanding of *symphonia*, for the concept of public religion the distinction between a "state" and a "people's" perspective on religion is central; religion can be understood as an independent source of motivation or a sense of belonging for citizens or as an institution that functions as a partner of the state. In this chapter, I explore in depth these two social orders of religion in the context of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. Focusing on the difference between a state church and a people's church, one recognizes that the two phenomena exist parallel to each other inside Russian Orthodoxy: the church as a recognized partner institution of the state and as a people's church. My thesis is that, against a background of totalitarianism, persecution, and emigration in the twentieth century, the two distinct social orders of Russian Orthodoxy have clearly emerged. With hindsight, we can trace a parallel development of a state-centered and a people-centered perspective on the church in history. In very broad strokes, I argue that the latter is the work of Russian monasticism, the Russian religious philosophical tradition, émigré theology, and religious dissidents in the Soviet Union; the former, by contrast, belongs to the Moscow Patriarchate, which has firmly held on to a state-centered perspective, from prerevolutionary tsarism on through Soviet domination and into present-day Russia. Both social orders of the Russian Orthodox Church play an important role in present-day Russia; both are, in principle, compatible with a secular state and democracy, and the two are in competition with each other, with the state-centered order insisting on formal establishment inside the Russian state and the people-centered order affirming the church's independence from the state.

Historical Sketch of the Two Social Orders of the Russian Orthodox Church

Following the Byzantine state-church model, *symphonia* was to be the determining factor in the development of relationships between the tsars and the Orthodox Church in Russia, since the Muscovite Rus′ saw itself as the direct

successor to the Byzantine Empire, which had ceased to exist in 1453. However, in the context of the emerging Russian Empire, the equilibrium between worldly and spiritual power gradually but constantly shifted in favor of the tsars and led to the church losing its equal share of power playing a subordinate role.[7] This in turn meant that the church that had hitherto been traditionally regarded as representing the people was now seen as representing and being legitimized by the state. While the contrast between a church of the people and the church as a hierarchical institution may be a constant for all Christian churches, I would argue that, in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church, the gap between these two "social orders" of Russian Orthodoxy acquired a particular significance. Dualistic models are necessarily reductive of a more complex social reality, but they nonetheless have explanatory power. In this chapter, I speak of this division as state church versus church of the people; other scholars have used (and transcended) different distinctions—church and believers, high and low church, elite and peasant church, authority and lived religion—to make a similar argument.[8]

Church, State, and People

The church reform of the eighteenth century is widely regarded as marking the subordination of the Russian Orthodox Church to the tsarist state regime and its role as state church within that regime.[9] In 1721, Peter I abolished the patriarchate and replaced it with a board of bishops called the Holy Synod. The Synod was supervised by a lay official, the chief procurator, and church-state relations were hitherto determined by the *Spiritual Regulation* (*Dukhovny reglament*, 1721), which oversaw religious and church life in numerous ways.[10] This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that clerics were regarded as state civil servants who were answerable to the police. Peter's refashioning of the church as subordinate to the state constituted a break with the Byzantine symphonic model.

While the Byzantine model had been one of balance between church and state, Peter's reforms introduced an Erastianism more commonly associated with Protestant churches in the West. The reform was fashioned mainly on Western models and influenced both the administrative machinery of the church and the structure and syllabus in schools of theological study. Russia was no exception to a general trend in Europe in the eighteenth century when, one after another, "the official churches . . . were subjected to royal absolutist control" and "became more and more ingratiated to the rising bourgeois classes."[11]

The Petrine reforms brought the Moscow Patriarchate into the position of a "handmaiden of the state," as Gregory L. Freeze terms it.[12] The role of the

church as absolute and an unrestricted ally of the state was intensified when, in the course of the nineteenth century, Orthodoxy came to be seen as a leading factor in preserving Russian and pan-Orthodox unity. One significant architectural landmark expressing this "national" unity between church and state is the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in the center of Moscow, commissioned by Tsar Alexander I to commemorate the defeat of Napoleon in 1812. The fate of this cathedral symbolizes the twists and turns of the Russian Orthodox Church's history as state church, and I will return to it in this chapter.

At the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the church hierarchy was under pressure, both from clergy within and from intellectuals outside the church, to reform. The desire for reform was also due to the political institutional situation of the church, still under the control of the state. The Petrine reforms, as pointed out by Randall A. Poole, had produced two very different responses in Russian society. One was irreligion or indifference, the other religious revival and call for reform.[13] On the question of irreligion and atheism, it is important to note that, in the period leading up to the Bolshevik Revolution, the chasm between religious and social issues had become increasingly unbridgeable. The plight and poverty of the Russian people had been exacerbated by the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the spread of industrialization. The church had done little to prevent class conflict, since the hierarchy had become increasingly out of touch with its traditional role as advocate of the people before the tsar. The church could not be brought to support the demands of the people against the tsar.

Whereas the hierarchy appeared out of touch with the grievances of believers, simple priests did react. A striking example of the ambivalent mood in which the church found itself, and which reigned on the eve of the revolution, are the events of Bloody Sunday in 1905. Tsar Nicholas II had a peaceful demonstration of workers fired on as they were marching toward the Winter Palace, led by the Russian Orthodox priest Georgij Gapon. The Holy Synod supported the cause of the tsar and condemned the demonstration. Another and less well-known conflict between "state" and "people's" church at that time is also worth mentioning: the dispute between the Holy Synod and the *imiaslavtsi* [name-glorifiers], a group of monastics who sought to revive the principles of ancient Eastern Orthodoxy on Mount Athos. The mystical approach and ascetic values defining their theological doctrine were rejected by the Moscow Patriarchate, which, aided by the tsarist military forces, had a number of Russian monks arrested on Mount Athos in 1913.[14] This conflict illustrates the deep rift between official theology and practiced spiritual life within the Russian Orthodox Church before the revolution.

The balance changed during the interim months between the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and the October Revolution of 1917. This short period became a window of opportunity for the Russian Orthodox Church, and the self-image gained during this time would continue to be of relevance up until today, more than a hundred years later.[15] The hurriedly convoked All-Russian Orthodox Council of 1917 marked the end of the Holy Synod and the reintroduction of the Muscovite patriarchal system. Central issues at the council included questions such as how far and to what extent the laity should be allowed to play an active role in the church leadership and whether parishes should be given greater independence. The council thus strengthened the "people's" perspective on the church. At the same time, the council expressed an approach to ecclesiastical law that, although envisaging a division of state and church powers, stipulated the hegemony of the Orthodox Church within the Russian state government system, thus upholding its ambition to play a special role inside the Russian state.[16] However, any hopes of either the one or the other model being implemented were quickly dashed when the Bolsheviks seized power.

In the period that followed, the Russian Orthodox Church became the subject of massive persecution and repression by the Soviet state, which meant either that the governing bodies of the church had to submit to the Communist regime to survive or, as was often the case, that antiestablishment believers were forced to work underground. In retrospect, we can distinguish a clear division between state-centered and people-centered values within the Russian Orthodox Church in Soviet Russia. The Moscow Patriarchate and its dignitaries, who did in part collaborate with the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), upheld a state-centered vision of the church; many ordinary believers and religious dissidents stood for a people-centered vision of the church.

The state order of Russian Orthodoxy was in part purposefully instigated by the Soviet government, first during World War II when it was a matter of drumming up public support for defense policy and then again in the 1980s when, in the throes of glasnost (openness), the church once again began to play a key role in public everyday life. The 1988 millennium celebrations commemorating the advent of Christianity in Russia were attended by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and broadcast on state television. Orthodoxy took center stage as a national hallmark everyone could relate to and identify with in some way. Today, more than thirty years on, the Russian Orthodox Church's status as an emblematic state institution appears to have been upheld. The Cathedral of Christ the Savior, destroyed by the Soviets in 1931 and painstakingly rebuilt during the 1990s, vividly symbolizes this process of restoration.

Monasticism, People's Church, Diaspora

Parallel to the growth of a state church, one can also trace a line from the fifteenth to the twentieth century showing Russian Orthodoxy becoming a church of the people. We could consider as a starting point for this parallel development the opposition to the reform of the monasteries under Joseph of Volokolamsk in the fifteenth century. Joseph was an advocate of monasteries as landowners to secure for the church political clout and leverage. His attempts to reform were met by strong opposition notably from those monks who lived by the teachings of Nilus of Sora the Athonite, who demanded a monastic life of contemplation in poverty and asceticism. This particular dispute ended in favor of Joseph's school of thought, even if modern-day historians concur on the judgment that the Josephites in the end failed to fulfill their key concern, namely, to establish an autonomous church.[17]

In the nineteenth century, the church dwelt under the conditions of the Petrine reforms and was increasingly criticized by reform-minded clergy, anticlerical intellectuals, and Orthodox Slavophiles alike for having become a mere instrument of the secular state.[18] One typical example of the critical mood at the time is found in Fyodor Dostoyevsky's 1880 novel *The Brothers Karamazov*, in the character Starets Zosima, who evokes a tradition of monastic life that had been eclipsed under the pressures of Joseph's reforms: the monastery as a place of asceticism and spirituality and in which the monk is regarded as mentor and counselor by the common people. The main accusation of the time was that a monk served no useful social purpose, and in the novel one finds both accusation and defense:

> For it is not we, but they, who are in isolation, though they don't see that. Of old, leaders of the people came from among us, and why should they not again? The same meek and humble ascetics will rise up and go out to work for the great cause. The salvation of Russia comes from the people. And the Russian monk has always been on the side of the people. We are isolated only if the people are isolated. The people believe as we do, and an unbelieving reformer will never do anything in Russia, even if he is sincere in heart and a genius. Remember that! The people will meet the atheist and overcome him, and Russia will be one and orthodox. Take care of the peasant and guard his heart. Go on educating him quietly. That's your duty as monks, for the peasant has God in his heart.[19]

In this passage, Dostoyevsky voiced a socially centered perspective within the tradition of Orthodoxy that built on completely different principles than those governing the church of his time. It was exactly this spiritual self-understanding

of church—far-removed from any clerical hierarchical understanding—that became the defining principle of the religious intelligentsia of the nineteenth century.[20] The years immediately preceding the Russian Revolution in 1917 represented the zenith of theological and philosophical debate pertaining to the way the church perceived itself and the way others saw it. The Religious-Philosophical Society of St. Petersburg is perhaps the best example reflecting the socially centered approach to the Orthodox tradition.[21] Key protagonists in this movement for renewal, who were moreover inclined to be moderately liberal in their political ideology, included Sergei Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdiaev, Semyon Frank, and Peter Struve. In *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*), a collection of essays published in 1909, they vehemently attacked revolutionist thinking as propounded by Vladimir Lenin and followers and instead advocated a return to a more Christian-Socialist school of thought, which they saw the Russian Orthodox Church as embodying. Their line of thinking was additionally inspired by Marxism, which demanded social justice and equality. It was against this backdrop that Bulgakov and Berdiaev voiced their opinions in the conflict between the church and the *imiaslavtsi*. They sympathized with the ideology embraced by the monks and rejected the authoritarian attitude of the church and government.[22]

The religio-philosophical and sociopolitical debates ended abruptly with the Bolshevik takeover. Many of the religious intelligentsia, including Bulgakov and Berdiaev, took their ideas and views with them when they emigrated in the early 1920s. While the diaspora of Russian religious life was characterized by institutional dispute and conflict over the right approach to the Moscow Patriarchate back in the Soviet Union, at the same time it voiced its views in theological debate, listing the many faults and weaknesses of Russian Orthodoxy that it wanted to see remedied by new theological approaches. Migration and the way events in the Soviet Union were assessed resulted in the traditional state-centered understanding of the church being questioned in its entirety. Which state was the church based on anyway? Was not the traditional church-state relationship ludicrous in that it had even submitted to recognizing Soviet sovereignty? The answers were as varied as their émigré advocates; the synod of Karlovac—which regarded itself as the new official home of the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia—remained loyal to a tsarist Russia that no longer existed; the Russian Orthodox community in Paris under the leadership of Bishop Evlogii broke away from Moscow and turned instead to the ecumenical patriarchs of Constantinople; the Russian Orthodox community in Great Britain chose to remain within the jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchy.[23]

Even more significant than these developments in institutional church-state relations was the theological redefinition of the role of the church in society. There were two decisive views in this regard: the first, led by Bulgakov, stressed

the social role and duties of the church and was keen on drawing up new codes of practice in Orthodox social teaching; and the second, headed by Georges Florovsky, envisaged a theological reform rooted in the patristic tradition.[24] For Florovsky and his students (including John Meyendorff), monastic life and particularly the practice of "hesychasm" were the backbone of the Orthodox faith.[25] By contrast, Christian Orthodoxy was kept alive outside of monastery walls and indeed outside of Russia by émigrés who carried out social and charitable work. One well-known example is that of the Orthodox nun Maria Skobtsova (Saint Maria of Paris), who during World War II worked with the French Resistance to help Jews and other refugees to escape a Nazi-controlled France and paid with her own life in the gas chambers of the Ravensbrück concentration camp.[26] What both schools of thought had in common were their efforts to keep the church a community or "congregation" of believers and their underscoring of the importance of human freedom in the Christian understanding of salvation. The state as such no longer assumed the dominant role it had previously played. In the diaspora, the Russian Orthodox Church was/became—at least in the eyes of this particular spiritual elite—a church for and of the people.[27]

Inside the Soviet Union, at the same time, another type of "emigration" was taking place, namely, an "inner emigration" of those religious individuals who remained in the Soviet Union but chose to reject the Soviet system and the restricted space it had allotted to the church. As they challenged the delicate compromise between the government and the church, they not only had run-ins with the Soviet regime authorities but also met the ire of the Moscow Patriarchate. The dissident priest Gleb Yakunin, for example, who repeatedly condemned the church for having been corrupted by the state and attacked the limits on freedom of worship in the Soviet Union, was sentenced to a labor camp in 1979. Another outspoken dissident, Zoja Krachmalnikova, was arrested in 1975 for setting up a literary religious journal.[28]

Monastery, people's church, diaspora—any of these three definitions could describe the "social order" of the Orthodox Church beyond the clutches of the state and its clinging on to the same. But they also describe the limits of the attempt to construct a viable public religious identity solely through reference to religious community. Modern-day observers tend to judge the role of the monastery much more critically than has been put forward here so far. The Russian sociologist Oleg Kharkhordin, for example, interprets the regulated world of monastic life as a model for Soviet *collectivization*.[29] I should add, however, that Kharkhordin has overlooked the fact that monastic life as propounded by Joseph of Volokolamsk, on whose writings he draws, was in contrast with the model of asceticism and mystic spirituality implied in my use of the term.

Vera Shevzov has critically pointed out that the distinction between the two religious subcultures, one represented by "the church" and the other by "the people," is a simplification and risks repeating the errors of the Soviet ethnographic tradition, which, combined with a methodology influenced by Marxist-Leninist principles, resulted in the study of a peasant or popular (*narodnoe*) Orthodoxy that was treated as if it had little connection to the institutional church.[30] Taking into due account such critical views on Russian Orthodoxy, one can nonetheless conclude that both a socially centered perspective and a state-centered perspective had at least a century-long historical lineage by the time of the Russian Revolution and continued throughout the Soviet period. And also, today, the two "social orders"—state church, on the one hand, and people's church, on the other—play an important role in defining Russian Orthodoxy.

The Two Orders of Public Religion in the Present-Day Russian Orthodox Church

I have distinguished two forms of public religion: religious persuasions in private that motivate public engagement and religious institutions that cooperate with the political sphere. Throughout the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, these two orders of public religion have been realized as religious dissidence in opposition to both church and state and as church partnership with the state. Both orders of public religion play an important role today. The Russian Orthodox Church of modern-day Russia continues to be linked to its traditional role as a state church. At the same time, Orthodox faith continues to be an engine for antiestablishment public engagement inside Russia.

The Church as Civil-Society Stakeholder

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the founding of the Russian Federation, the Moscow Patriarchate entered a new phase of its history in seeking to consolidate its position of privilege as partner of the state. If the law on freedom of religions in 1990 had envisaged equality of all religious organizations in the Soviet Union, the amended law in 1997 foresaw a two-tier religious system in Russia whereby "traditional" and "foreign" religious communities were distinguished.[31] This move represented a revival of the objectives of the 1917 Church Council under changed auguries.[32]

In the document *Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church*, adopted by the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000, we

also find clear indications for the self-acclaimed special status of Orthodoxy in the Russian state.[33] Chapters 2–5 of the document—"Church and Nation," "Church and State," "Christian Ethics and Secular Law," and "Church and Politics"—are devoted to the balance between the religious and political orders. The statements on nation, state, and politics contained in "Social Concept" present the Russian Orthodox Church as a fundamental authority in Russian society that encourages not only moral but also patriotic values and principles.[34] The church appears to be pinning its hopes on a unique relationship to the state to achieve its social, charitable, educational, and other social programs. The architects of the "Social Concept" adhere to the traditional model of *symphonia* as the ideal church-state relationship but acknowledge that this model has historically never been fully realized and, regarding modern-day needs and circumstances, is not feasible.[35]

Chapter 3 of "Social Concept," titled "Church and State," contains a critical reflection on the domination of the state over the church throughout Russian history. The chapter places a strong emphasis on non-subordination and church independence. The precise definition can be found in Chapter 3, section 5, of the official English translation on the website of the Moscow Patriarchate: "'The Church remains loyal to the state, but God's commandment to fulfil the task of salvation in any situation and under any circumstances is above this loyalty. If the authority forces Orthodox believers to apostatize from Christ and His Church and to commit sinful and spiritually harmful actions, the Church should refuse to obey the state.'"[36]

This emphasis on non-subordination constitutes a break with the overarching logic of the entire document, which suggests that the public role of the Russian Orthodox Church is something to be negotiated with the state. At the same time, it is, as I have pointed out elsewhere, not necessarily of a liberal nature.[37] Judging from the agendas of different institutions that manifest the church's status as a civil-society stakeholder, the independent role of the Russian Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the Russian state appears that of a conservative nationalist actor intent on preventing liberal reforms. The World Russian People's Council (Vsemirnyi Russkii Narodnyi Sobor), for example, has become a center for Orthodox nationalist ideas and ideologically covers the right wing of both the government and the church.[38]

People's Church and Civil Society

For the opposite, people's perspective on Russian Orthodoxy, the legacy of monastic life and the diaspora continues to play an important role. Those Russian Orthodox communities in emigration that developed independently outside

of Russia throughout the Cold War have become living examples for another model of Orthodox church life. In particular, they have provided lay members a greater and more active part in the church. Orthodox intellectuals who learned about this reality after the end of the Cold War were impressed.[39] When the Soviet Union came to an end and the Moscow Patriarchate tried to renew its influence on its diaspora communities, conflict was destined to ensue. The most memorable example of conflict between the Moscow Central Church and satellite congregations was the schism inside the Russian Orthodox Church in the United Kingdom in 2006, when the incumbent bishop deemed it better to leave the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate and set up a new diocese of Great Britain and Ireland under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Viewed by many Moscow-friendly observers as a drastic step triggered by personal animosities, those directly involved spoke of an untenable conflict between conservative and liberal views of the church, which manifested in attitudes toward the liturgy being conducted in English rather than Russian and other ecumenical activities.[40]

In 2013, Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church–state bond, became the site of a protest performance by the punk group Pussy Riot. The performance itself was politically motivated, but the court trial exemplified the division between a state- and a people's-centered perspective on the church. One member of the punk group said before the court that the performance was intended to lead "intelligent people to the thought that Orthodox culture belongs not only to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Patriarch, and Putin, but it can also be on the side of civil insurrection and the oppositional mood within Russia."[41]

A socially centered approach that continues an age-old tradition of people's church is a component part of present-day Russian Orthodoxy. Although it may only be expressed in confined spaces by small church communities, in academic institutions, and in artistic circles, its impact should not be underestimated. It interrupts the state-centered point of view that dominates the church. The religious dimension of a civil society is no longer dominated by a Moscow Patriarchate, but could potentially be the seedbed of religious initiatives.

The question I posed at the outset of the chapter was whether the Russian Orthodox Church today is orientated more toward the state or toward the people and what conditions and quantifiers determined each side of the issue. This historical overview has shown that the Russian Orthodox Church is, both institutionally and politically, very much anchored in its role as "state" church. At the same time, however, it become clear that if we take a wider perspective on Russian Orthodoxy, including non-church arenas and Russian Orthodoxy

outside of the Russian territory, this picture changes. Against a history of totalitarian rule, persecution, and forced emigration throughout the twentieth century, both the state-centered order and the socially centered establishment define the character of Russian Orthodoxy. Both sides must be considered when discussing the relationship between Russian Orthodoxy and secular state power, since both represent phenomena running parallel to each other and demonstrate the duality of public religion.